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Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal Interpretation
*

Lawrence M. Solan * & Tammy Gales *

In this paper, we set out to explore conditions in which the use of
large linguistic corpora can be optimally employed by judges and others
tasked with construing authoritative legal documents. Linguistic
corpora, sometimes containing billions of words, are a source of
information about the distribution of language usage. Thus, corpora
and the tools for using them are most likely to assist in addressinglegal
issues when the law considers the distribution of language usage to be
legally relevant. As Thomas R. Lee and Stephen C. Mouritsen have so
ably demonstrated in earlier work, corpus analysis is especially helpful
when the legal standardfor construction is the ordinarymeaning of the
document's terms. We argue here that four issues should be addressed
before determining that corpus analysis is likely to be maximally
convincing. First, the legal issue before the court must be about the
distribution of linguistic facts. Second, the court must decide what
makes an interpretation "ordinary." hird, if one wishes to search a
corpus to glean the ordinary meaning of a term, one must decide in
advance what to search. Fourth, there are different reasons as to why a
particularmeaning might present a weak showing in a corpus search,
and these need to be understood. Each of these issues is described
and discussed.
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INTRODUCTION

In this Article, we explore conditions in which the use of large
linguistic corpora can be optimally employed by judges and others
tasked with construing authoritative legal documents. Linguistic
corpora, sometimes containing billions of words, are a source of
information about the distribution of language usage both between
populations and within a single population. Thus, corpora and the
tools for using them are most likely to assist in addressing legal issues
when the law considers the distribution of language usage to be
legally relevant. As Thomas R. Lee and Stephen C. Mouritsen have
so ably demonstrated in earlier work, corpus analysis is especially
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helpful when the legal standard for construction is the ordinary
meaning of a law's terms.'
We argue here that four issues should be addressed before
turning to corpus linguistics as the most efficacious tool in statutory
interpretation. First, the legal issue before the court must be about
the distribution of linguistic facts. Surely, separating the "ordinary"
sense of an expression from outlying ones meets this criterion. As we
show below, however, courts do not universally adopt the ordinary
meaning of a term. Instead, they often engage in detailed inquiry
into the context of the legislation to determine what meaning was
most likely intended.
Second, along these same lines, the court must decide, as a legal
matter, what makes an interpretation "ordinary." 2 In one Supreme
Court case, Justice Breyer held that a particular meaning of the word
"carry" was ordinary because one-third of usages in a corpus of news
articles conveyed the same meaning.' In a sense it is ordinary, in that
people appear to be comfortable using the word to convey that
particular meaning. In another sense, it is not ordinary to the extent
that a second meaning predominates over the remaining two-thirds
of recorded instances of usage.'
Third, if one wishes to search a corpus to glean the ordinary
meaning of a term, one must decide, in advance, what to search. In a
case decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan, all seven justices
agreed that a corpus search was a superior way to determine ordinary
meaning but divided four to three on what terms to evaluate.' This is
especially apt to happen when a law contains a term that typically has
one meaning when unmodified but is subject to modification that
suggests the default meaning was not the intended one. The

1. See Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, YALE L.J.
(forthcoming); Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus
Linguistics as an Empirical Path to Plain Meaning, 13 COLUM. SC. & TECH. L. REV. 156
(2011); Stephen C. Mouritsen, Note, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress:DefinitionalFallacies
and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REv. 1915 [hereinafter
Mouritsen, Dictionary].
2. See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 1, for further discussion.
3. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 129, 140 (1998).
4. We discuss this case in detail below. See Mouritsen, Dictionary, supra note 1, for a
more refined corpus analysis of this case.
5. People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 2016).
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Michigan case, for example, involved deciding whether the word
information includes false statements or is ordinarily limited to true
statements. While we can speak of inaccurate information, when we
use the word without modification, we typically understand it as
referring to actual facts.
Fourth, there are two very different reasons for a particular
meaning to present a weak showing in a corpus search. In some
instances, it is possible, but awkward, to use a particular expression
to describe an event or a set of circumstances. For example, in
Chisom v. Roemer, a case that dealt with the scope of the Voting
Rights Act, the Court had to determine whether the law's reference
to the election of representativesshould be read in its ordinary sense,
rendering the statute inapplicable to the election of judges.' All nine
Justices agreed that representative is usually applied to members of
the legislative branch and not the judicial branch, but the majority
construed the statute more broadly than the law's ordinary meaning
based on the assumption that Congress did not intend to create a
safe harbor for racially discriminatory schemes for the election
of judges.
In other cases, a particular usage may be absent from a corpus
not because speakers are uncomfortable using the expression in that
way, but because it reflects relevant circumstances that do not often
arise. Consider Smith v. United States, the 1993 Supreme Court
decision in which a majority of six Justices held that a person who
attempted to trade his unloaded machine gun for illegal drugs had
"'use[d]' . . . a firearm . . . 'during and in relation to .

.

. [a] drug

trafficking crime.'"" The case hinged on whether he had "used the
gun" in the ordinary sense of that expression. Justice Scalia's colorful
dissent argued that when we think about someone using a gun we
think about that person using it as a weapon.' He was right about
that; however, apart from linguistic arguments, the majority argued
that the structure of the statute suggested that a broader

6. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
7. Id. at 403-04.
8. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 225 (1993) (second alteration in original)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988)).
9. Id. at 242-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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interpretation of use was warranted.o In contrast with understanding
representative to include judges, moreover, it does not seem strange
to say that Smith really did use a gun in a drug crime. He just used it
in an unusual way.
Thus, there are two reasons that a meaning may be absent from a
corpus. The first is a fact about language: people may not feel that
the meaning fits comfortably within the concept that the word
denotes and typically do not use it in those circumstances, although
it may be possible to do so at the margins. The second reason that a
particular meaning may be absent from a corpus concerns facts about
the world, rather than facts about or knowledge of language. The
blue pitta is a bird found in Asia but not North America." It is no
less a bird, and we are no less comfortable calling it a bird just
because it does not appear in corpora of American English. This
example further illustrates the necessity of selecting an appropriate
corpus to analyze ordinary meaning.
Should the legal system concern itself with the distinct reasons
for a term not appearing in a corpus? That depends on whether the
legal system should examine ordinary meaning to inquire further
into a statute's purpose or whether the legal system relies on
ordinary meaning to capture the situations that likely triggered the
legislation. In the former case, it matters why a particular use of a
word does not appear in a corpus in a particular circumstance.
Below, we argue that these two perspectives can be merged through
a process of double dissociation. 2 That is, the strongest cases for
using corpus analysis are ones in which not only does one meaning
predominate over an alternative meaning in an appropriate corpus,
but the second, less common meaning is generally expressed using
language other than the language in the disputed statute. Put in
linguistic terms, the question is whether the legal system should use
corpora as a reflection of the distribution of language use as an
external matter, or whether it should regard corpora as windows into
the internalworkings of the mind, to the extent that corpora reflect
10.

Id. at 240.

11.

J.

Erritzoe, Blue Pitta (Hydrornis cyaneus), HANDBOOK OF THE BIRDS OF THE

WORLD ALIVE (J. del Hoyo et al. eds., 2017), http://www.hbw.com/species/blue-pittahydrornis-cyaneus.
12. See infra Section III.B.4.
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when people are actually comfortable using an expression in a
particular circumstance.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, we
discuss ordinary meaning as a foundational principle of legal
interpretation and the extent to which it is defeasible. Part II briefly
outlines the ways that judges seek to determine a term's ordinary
meaning-most often through their sense about word meaning but
augmented by the use of dictionaries. Part III first presents an
introduction to corpus linguistics, then discusses a recent trend to
introduce linguistic corpora into the analysis, and, finally, evaluates
the various cases according to our four proposed criteria listed above.
Part IV is a brief conclusion.
I. ORDINARY MEANING AS AN INTERPRETIVE NORM

A. The Centralityof the OrdinaryMeaning Principle
Scholars and judges from across the political spectrum routinely
apply the ordinary meaning canon." To illustrate, consider Justice
Scalia's majority opinion in the 2014 Supreme Court case Burrage v.
United States." Burrage, a drug dealer, sold heroin to a user who
died the next day from a drug overdose. The Controlled Substances
Act calls for an enhanced sentence for a defendant who has sold
illegal drugs when "death or serious bodily injury results from the
use of such substance."" At trial, medical experts testified that it was
impossible to determine whether the heroin Burrage sold the user
was a but-for cause of death or a contributing factor of a death that

13.

Linguists

and philosophers occupy both camps. For the leading internalist
&

perspective, see NOAM CHOMSKY, KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE: ITS NATURE, ORIGIN, AND
USE (1986). For a good exposition of the externalist perspective, see ERNIE LEPORE
MATTHEW STONE, IMAGINATION AND CONVENTION: DISTINGUISHING GRAMMAR AND
INFERENCE IN LANGUAGE (2015). For critique of Lepore and Stone, see Laurence Horn,

Conventional Wisdom Reconsidered, 59 INQUIRY 145 (2016).
14. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON How TO
READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 33-84 (2016); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 69-77 (2012); BRIAN G.
SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING: A THEORY OF THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2015); LAWRENCE M. SoLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS

50-81 (2010).
15. Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014).

AND THEIR INTERPRETATION

16.

1316
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might have occurred anyway because of the various drugs ingested
during the binge, including, but not limited to, the heroin Burrage
had sold. This raised the interpretive issue of whether the death
"resulted from the use" of the substance that Burrage provided."
Justice Scalia resolved the issue by relying on the ordinary meaning
of "resulting from," which denotes causation:
The language Congress enacted requires death to "result from" use
of the unlawfully distributed drug, not from a combination of
factors to which drug use merely contributed. Congress could have
written § 841(b)(1)(C) to impose a mandatory minimum when the
underlying crime "contributes to" death or serious bodily injury, or
adopted a modified causation test tailored to cases involving
concurrent causes, as five States have done .

. .

. It chose instead to

.

use language that imports but-for causality. Especially in the
interpretation of a criminal statute subject to the rule of lenity, . .
we cannot give the text a meaning that is different from its
ordinary, accepted meaning, and that disfavors the defendant.18

Justice Scalia provided two justifications for applying the
ordinary meaning of the term. The first is that Congress
presumptively intended this meaning. For, if Congress intended a
different, broader interpretation, it could have said so in clear
language-as other legislatures have done in enacting statutes
covering the same situations. Thus, the ordinary meaning approach.
enhances democratic values because it presumptively captures the
will of the legislature. His second argument, for which he adduced
the rule of lenity, is quite different. Regardless of what the legislature
intended, adhering to the ordinary meaning of statutory language
enhances the rule of law because it takes into account the likelihood
that citizens subject to the law-the criminal law in particular-are
on adequate notice of behavioral norms that society will enforce.
The argument is reminiscent of Oliver Wendell Holmes's 1931
opinion for a unanimous Court in McBoyle v. United States19 that a
1919 federal law criminalizing the movement of stolen vehicles
across state lines should not be applied to airplanes since, at the time

17.
18.
19.

Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 885.
Id. at 891.
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931).
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of enactment, airplanes would not have been within the ordinary
understanding of the word vehicle. At the conclusion of a very short
opinion, Holmes remarked:
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the
text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a
fair warning should be given to the world in language that the
common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a
certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible
the line should be clear. When a rule of conduct is laid down in
words that evoke in the common mind only the picture of vehicles
moving on land, the statute should not be extended to aircraft
simply because it may seem to us that a similar policy applies, or
upon the speculation that if the legislature had thought of it, very
likely broader words would have been used.20
"Fair warning" to the accused is not about deference to the
legislature. Rather, it is itself a very basic rule-of-law value, regardless
of what the legislature had in mind. Chief Justice John Marshall
articulated this principle in 1821 in United States v. Wiltberger.2 1
Wiltberger committed manslaughter by killing an individual while
aboard an American vessel docked in the Tigris River in China. 22 A
federal statute made it a federal offense to commit certain crimes on
American vessels abroad. 23 The provision that covered murder
included murder committed "upon the high seas, or in any river,
haven, basin, or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State,"
but the provision that covered manslaughter included only "the
high seas." 24
The most sensible inference to draw is that Congress simply
made a mistake in omitting the other bodies of water from the
manslaughter provision. Marshall recognized this but rejected it as a
proper way to conduct statutory interpretation:
It has been argued, and, we admit, with great force, that in this
section the legislature intended to take from a citizen offending

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

1318

Id. at 27.
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 76 (1820).
Id. at 77.
Id. at 77-86.
Id. at 79-80.
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against the United States, under colour of a commission from a
foreign power, any pretence to protection from that commission;
and it is almost impossible to believe that there could have been a
deliberate intention to distinguish between the same offence,
committed under colour of such commission, on the high seas, and
on the waters of a foreign State, or of the United States, out of the
jurisdiction of any particular State. This would unquestionably have
been the operation of the section, had the words, 'on the high
seas,' been omitted. Yet it would be carrying construction very far
to strike out those words. Their whole effect is to limit the
operation which the sentence would have without them; and it is
making very free with legislative language, to declare them totally
useless, when they are sensible, and are calculated to have a decided
influence on the meaning of the clause.25
Thus, Marshall favored an ordinary meaning approach because it
gave fair warning to the defendant even though the legislature most
likely intended a broader meaning.
Scholars have also espoused both rationales-carrying out the
intent of the legislature and giving public notice of the law-for
preferring a law's ordinary meaning. William Eskridge, often a vocal
critic of Scalia's thinking,2 6 makes very similar points when it comes
to the centrality of ordinary meaning in statutory interpretation.
Like Scalia, he sees value in the approach, both as a default
interpretation most likely to reflect the will of the legislature and as a
value in its own right, enhancing the law's legitimacy because of its
greater accessibility.2 7 Brian Slocum, in his book on ordinary
meaning, also emphasizes the overlapping values of employing
the concept.2 8
This consensus leaves open, however, a set of questions about
which there is far less agreement. Among them are:
* What do we mean by ordinary meaning? When we speak of
what a word ordinarily is used to mean, we can refer to the
one most typical meaning or to a range of meanings that are

25. Id. at 99-100.
26. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113
COLUM. L. REv. 531 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA& GARNER, supra note 14).
27.
28.

ESKRIDGE, supranote 14, at 35.
See SLOCUM, supra note 14.
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all reasonably common, regardless of which one is the
most common.
How much of a role should context play in our analysis? A
word may typically be used to convey one thought in a
particular context but typically be used to convey a different
thought in another context.
If one of those contexts occurs more frequently than the
other, should we call the meaning associated with that
context the ordinary meaning, or should we consider them
both ordinary? For example, if we speak more about savings
banks than we do about river banks, should we conclude that
only the sense of the word that describes financial institutions
is ordinary? Or should we say that both meanings are within
ordinary usage?
When a word whose meaning changes when modified is used
without a modifier in a legal setting, should we assume that
the legislature had the unmodified default interpretation in
mind, or should we assume that it had in mind how that
word might be understood with whatever modifications are
likely to be relevant? Some words have one meaning when
not accompanied by a modifier, such as an adjective, but can
be modified to expand our range of plausible interpretations.
An example from the case law discussed below is the
word information.29 We can speak of false or inaccurate
information, but when we just use the word alone, we
typically mean to describe an accurate account of facts.
B. The Defeasibility of the OrdinaryMeaning Principle

As central as ordinary meaning is in the interpretation of laws, it
is defeasible. Sometimes courts determine that the legislature
intended an interpretation that is either broader or narrower than
the prototypical use of a word or phrase. Narrower interpretations
often occur when the context in which the law was enacted suggests
that the legislature had in mind only a subset of the plausible
situations in which the language of the statute might apply. By the

29.

1320
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same token, courts sometimes construe a statute as having a broader
interpretation than ordinary meaning would dictate.
To illustrate from some recent cases decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court under Chief Justice Roberts, consider Yates v. United
States."o Following corporate scandals that occurred in the first years
of this century, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which
placed disclosure obligations on corporate executives, accountants,
and lawyers and prohibited the destruction of documents and other
materials to thwart government investigations even if those materials
had not yet been subpoenaed." This provision was a reaction to the
behavior of Arthur Andersen LLP, the accounting firm of Enron
Corporation, which had been manipulating prices in the energy
sector.32 The accounting firm destroyed documents and
electronically-stored information on the eve of a government
investigation into its role in the Enron scandal." As a result, the firm
was convicted of obstructing justice." That conviction, however, was
reversed because the firm had not yet been subpoenaed and claimed
that it was under no legal obligation to maintain the records. Soon
thereafter, in 2002, Congress made it clear that the destruction of
documents in anticipation of a federal investigation would be a
criminal act going forward. The relevant portion of the SarbanesOxley Act provides:
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers
up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or
tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence
the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States . .
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years,
or both.

30. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
31. Id. at 1074.
32. For an overview of the facts surrounding Arthur Andersen's involvement in the
Enron scandal, see Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
33. Id. at 696, 700.
34. Id. at 696-98.
35. Id. at 708.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012).
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Fast forward a decade. John Yates was a commercial fisherman
catching grouper in the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Florida."
Some of the fish caught and crated on his fishing boat were smaller
than the legal minimum size." When law enforcement agents pulled
up alongside Yates's vessel, Yates had the undersized fish thrown
overboard and replaced them with larger fish in the same crates. 39
Yates was prosecuted and convicted by the trial court of violating the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act for having destroyed a tangible object [dead
fish] for the purpose of impeding a government investigation.40
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction in a five-to-four
decision, holding that the act should not be applied to this situation
because, read in context, the relevant provision should be limited to
the destruction of financial records, whether stored on paper or on a
tangible object (such as a computer drive)." Justice Ginsburg noted
in her majority opinion:
Whether a statutory term is unambiguous, however, does not

turn solely on dictionary definitions of its component words.
Rather, "[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is
determined [not only] by reference to the language itself, [but as
well by] the specific context in which that language is used, and the
broader context of the statute as a whole." 42
Indeed, the noscitur a sociis canon says that statutory words
should be construed in association with the words that surround
them. 43 By the same token, the title of the statutory provision,
"Destruction, Alteration, or Falsification of Records in Federal
Investigations and Bankruptcy," suggests that the law was intended
to deal with documents and the like, not fish. Courts are reluctant to
use a law's title to override the law's substantive provisions, but they

37. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1079 (2015).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1080.
40. Id. at 1080-81.
41. Id. at 1088-89.
42. Id. at 1081-82 (citations omitted).
43. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 14, at 76-78; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 14,
at 195-98.
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are willing to take a statute's title into account to add sufficient
context to help determine the scope of the words within the law."
Justice Kagan (usually an ally of Justice Ginsburg on the Court)
wrote a dissenting opinion that began with the ordinary meaning
approach to statutory interpretation: "When Congress has not
supplied a definition, we generally give a statutory term its ordinary
meaning."" Thus, the Court was divided over the extent to which it
is appropriate to engage in individual inquiry into legislative intent in
the teeth of the default rule of ordinary meaning.
Consider, similarly, Bond v. United States," a 2014 unanimous
Supreme Court decision (with three Justices concurring in the
judgment on constitutional instead of statutory grounds). Dr. Bond
discovered that the father of her close friend's soon-to-be-born child
was Bond's own husband."7 A microbiologist, she took from her
workplace a powder that could cause a skin rash upon contact and
spread it on her friend's door knob, mailbox, and other such surfaces
to induce irritation.4 8 Eventually it worked." Bond was caught and
prosecuted for violating the statute that implements the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling,
and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction,o a treaty that
the United States ratified in 1997. The statute defines chemical
weapon as follows: "A toxic chemical and its precursors, except where
intended for a purpose not prohibited under this chapter as long as
the type and quantity is consistent with such a purpose."" The
chemicals used by Bond, if ingested in sufficient quantity, could be
fatal.5 2 The statute defines toxic chemical as follows:
The term "toxic chemical" means any chemical
chemical action on life processes can cause
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or
includes all such chemicals, regardless of their

44.

See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 14, at 221.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Yates, 134 S. Ct. at 1091 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
Id. at 2085.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2085.
18 U.S.C. § 229F(1)(A) (2012).
Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085.

which through its
death, temporary
animals. The term
origin or of their
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produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere. 3
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they are

Thus, the substance used by Bond met the statutory definition of
toxic chemical.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and its affirmance
by the Third Circuit. 1 It held that the Chemical Weapons
Convention was intended to respond to war crimes, not to the facts
of this case, which seemed to be a simple assault and more
appropriate for local prosecution." Chief Justice Roberts wrote for
the majority:
But even with its broadly worded definitions, we have doubts that a
treaty about chemical weapons has anything to do with Bond's
conduct. The Convention, a product of years of worldwide study,
analysis, and multinational negotiation, arose in response to war
crimes and acts of terrorism. There is no reason to think the
sovereign nations that ratified the Convention were interested in
anything like Bond's common law assault.s6
Roberts had a point--one would not ordinarily regard what Dr.
Bond did as a crime that violated a ban on the use of chemical
weapons. But, as Roberts comes close to conceding, if one pays
attention to the statutory definition of toxic chemical, rather than to
the everyday use of chemical warfare, the linguistic argument is hard
to maintain." More convincing is the structural argument, similar to
the majority's argument in Yates, that the law implementing the
treaty was not likely intended to extend its reach to minor crimes
outside the ordinary jurisdiction of the federal government and
within the constitutional power of the states." Thus, ordinary
meaning bowed to the statute's structure, its purpose, and principles
of federalism.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
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In separate concurring opinions, Justices Scalia," Thomas,' and
Alito" would have declared the law implementing the treaty
unconstitutional as a usurpation of state power. Justice Scalia made it
clear that as far as he was concerned, Bond had violated the law,
based on its language.6 2 Thus, he rejected the majority's reliance on
the ordinary meaning of the words in the title and, implicitly, its
structural argument." Scalia wrote:
The statute parses itself. There is no opinion of ours, and none
written by any court or put forward by any commentator since
Aristotle, which says, or even suggests, that 'dissonance' between
ordinary meaning and the unambiguous words of a definition is to
be resolved in favor of ordinary meaning.'
As for the constitutional argument, which all three dissenters
embraced as a reason for striking down the statute as outside
congressional authority, Justice Alito summarized the argument succinctly:
The control of true chemical weapons, as that term is customarily
understood, is a matter of great international concern, and
therefore the heart of the Convention clearly represents a valid
exercise of the treaty power. But insofar as the Convention may be
read to obligate the United States to enact domestic legislation
criminalizing conduct of the sort at issue in this case, which
typically is the sort of conduct regulated by the States, the
61
Convention exceeds the scope of the treaty power.
The debate among the justices in Bond illustrates a long-standing
tension in statutory analysis between construing statutes in a manner
that would avoid constitutional issues and addressing constitutional
issues directly. What is unusual about Bond is that both sides of the
debate came to the same conclusion about the outcome of the case.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See
Id.
Id.

at 2094 (Scalia, J., concurring).
at 2102 (Thomas, J., concurring).
at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring).
at 2094 (Scalia, J., concurring).
id. at 2096-97.
at 2096.
at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring).
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A more typical illustration is United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc.," a case interpreting the federal law criminalizing the
transmission of child pornography. The statute was poorly drafted, so
that one interpretation seemed to impose strict criminal liability for
those who knew they were sending some kind of depiction (video
tapes in this instance) but did not know that the depictions
contained child pornography." The statute read in relevant part:
(a) Any person who(1) knowingly transports or ships using any means or facility of
interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce by any means including by computer or mails,
any visual depiction, if(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

68

The owner of a business called X-Citement Video was peddling
videos containing child pornography. 6 ' He claimed that the statute

was unconstitutional because it required the government to prove
that he knew that he was distributing pornographic videos but not
that he knew the players were underage.7 0 The wording of the
statute, however, does not appear to require that the defendant
know that he was shipping depictions containing child
pornography." Knowingly seems to modify only "transports or ships
in interstate . . . commerce . . . any visual depiction." 72 He certainly
knew he was doing that.
The justices agreed that absent a mens rea requirement for the
element that the depiction contain pornography, the law would be
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
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United States v. X-Citernent Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
Id. at 68-70.
18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2012).
X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 66.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 68.
Id.
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unconstitutional." A majority of seven, in an opinion written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected "the most grammatical reading" of
the language as written, judicially amending the statute to include a
state of mind requirement for the element that the depiction contain
child pornography." Justice Stevens concurred by saying that the
statute, as written, should be construed as containing such a
requirement." Justice Scalia dissented, saying the statute was
unconstitutional," presaging his concurrence in Bond some twenty
years later."
Courts do, at times, give statutory terms meanings that are
broader than their ordinary usage would suggest. For example,
Chisolm v. Roemer," discussed above," held that state supreme court
justices come within the category of representativesunder the Voting
Rights Act."
More recently in 2015, in King v. Burwell," the Court construed
language in the Affordable Care Act ("Obamacare") more broadly
than ordinary usage would permit.8 2 The statute requires those with
incomes deemed sufficient to pay the premiums" to purchase health
insurance or pay a fine." It further calls for federal government
subsidies through the tax system for those who do not meet the
income threshold and who purchase their insurance on "an
Exchange established by the State."" Not all of the states established
exchanges on which its residents could buy health insurance. The
statute called for the federal government to establish exchanges in
those states that decided not to participate on their own." The
73. Id. at 78.
74. See id. at 70 (discussing whether the justices should amend the statute judicially to
include the state of mind requirement that would allow it to meet constitutional requirements).
75. See id. at 79 (Stevens, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 86 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2094-2111 (2014).
78. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
79. See supra Intro.
80. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 399.
81. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
82. Id. at 2492.
83. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(a), (e)(1)(A) (2012).
84. 26 U.S.C. 9 5000A.
85. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A).
86. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487.
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plaintiffs in King were residents of Virginia, a state that did not
establish an exchange." Rather, the federal government established
the exchange on its behalf." The plaintiffs claimed that, because the
Virginia insurance exchange was not "established by the state," the
residents were not entitled to the subsidies through the Internal
Revenue Service and, therefore, should be considered outside the
mandate requiring them to buy the insurance.8 9
Writing for a majority of six Justices, Chief Justice Roberts held
the statute to be "ambiguous."o The majority acknowledged that
the ordinary interpretation of the phrase established by the State
would suggest that the state itself had to establish the exchange for
the provision to apply. However, the Court held that, in the context
of the entire statute, the intended meaning of the expression
included exchanges established by the federal government on behalf
of the state if the state did not set up its own exchange:

'

Petitioners' arguments about the plain meaning of Section 36B are
strong. But while the meaning of the phrase "an Exchange
established by the State . . . " may seem plain "when viewed in
isolation," such a reading turns out to be "untenable in light of
[the statute] as a whole." In this instance, the context and structure
of the Act compel us to depart from what would otherwise be the
most natural reading of the pertinent statutory phrase. 9
We do not agree with the Chief Justice that the law was
"ambiguous." 92 Rather, it was inconsistent or contained an
incoherence. More convincing is the Court's structural argumentwithout the subsidies, the entire system of the act would collapse in a
majority of the states, and it is unlikely that Congress intended that
to happen.93
For jurisprudential reasons, the Court was reluctant to say that
Congress had erred in its wording (choosing instead to declare the

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2488.
90. Id. at 2492.
91. Id. at 2495. (quoting Dep't of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332,
343 (1994)).
92. Id. at 2491.
93. See id. at 2496.
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statute ambiguous),94 but in all likelihood the inconsistent language
among the statute's provisions was an oversight in a complicated law
whose language was being negotiated up until the time of
enactment. As Abbe Gluck explains in her perceptive article about
this case, the language arose from the Senate bill's having drawn on
language from the drafts of two different committees, and because of
the procedure used to enact the law, there was no opportunity to
clean it up through a conference committee that would reconcile the
House and Senate versions.95 The Chief Justice recognized this
reality and resolved the law's inconsistencies to further its "overall
statutory scheme" 96 as identified in the structure of the statute itself.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has, in other contexts, had little
trouble inferring that state means state or federal. Mims v. Arrow
Financial Services, LLC,9 7 involved the interpretation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), which
prohibits telemarketers from engaging in robocalls and other such
practices. If a pattern of such conduct emerges within a state, the
state Attorney General may bring an action. With respect to TCPA
actions brought by State Attorneys General, the statute provides:
"The

district

courts of the

United States .

.

. have

exclusive

jurisdiction." 98 The statute also grants a private right of action. With
respect to the jurisdiction of those cases, the statute says:
A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws
or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of
that State(A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the
regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin
such violation,
94. For a discussion of the Court's reluctance to declare a statute to be erroneously
drafted and then to correct it, see Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener's Error, 110 Nw. U. L. REV.
811, 813 (2016) (arguing that the Court generally requires uncontestable evidence of an error
before applying the doctrine).
95. See Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress's
Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 63, 76-77 (2015).
96. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492. For a theory of legislation as plans, see ScoTT J.
SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011).
97. Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 368-70 (2012). Our thanks to
Jonah Gelbach for bringing this case to our attention. This case was not part of the discussion
in King.
98. 47 U.S.C. § 2 2 7 (g)( 2 ) (2012).
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(B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such
a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such
violation, whichever is greater, or
(C) both such actions."

Mims believed that Arrow Financial Services' calls had violated
the statute and brought a case in federal court. Arrow successfully
moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
based on the provision just quoted. The dismissal was upheld on
appeal. However, in a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court
reversed. The Court ruled that the specific mention of state
jurisdiction does not strip the court of the federal question
jurisdiction it would ordinarily have as a matter of law. Comparing
the exclusivity provision for Attorneys General to the grant of
jurisdiction to state courts in private rights of action, the Court
reasoned: "Section 227(g)(2)'s exclusivity prescription 'reinforce[s]
the conclusion that [47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)'s] silence . . . leaves the
jurisdictional grant of § 1331 untouched. For where otherwise
applicable jurisdiction was meant to be excluded, it was
excluded expressly."" 00
By the same token, if Congress had intended to permit the ACA
to fail by its very structure, disallowing subsidies for those who live
in states in which the federal government initiated exchanges on
behalf of the state, it most likely would have indicated this intent
directly in one way or another.'
Justice Scalia would have none of this:
Any effort to understand rather than to rewrite a law must accept
and apply the presumption that lawmakers use words in "their
natural and ordinary signification." Ordinary connotation does not
always prevail, but the more unnatural the proposed interpretation
of a law, the more compelling the contextual evidence must be to
show that it is correct. Today's interpretation is not merely
unnatural; it is unheard of. Who would ever have dreamt that

99.

47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).

100. Mims, 565 U.S. at 380-81 (alterations in original) (quoting Verizon Md., Inc. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U. S. 635, 644 (2002)).
101.
See Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Sherlock Holmes Canon, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1 (2016).
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"Exchange established by the State" means "Exchange established
by the State or the Federal Government"?l0 2
Thus, whether interpreting a statute more narrowly or more
broadly than ordinary meaning would permit, it is within the court's
discretion to treat ordinary meaning as defeasible and to use
contextual
information-including
a statute's purpose
and
structure-as interpretive tools. The debate among jurists and
scholars is how defeasible ordinary meaning should be in these
circumstances. This issue sets a boundary condition on the efficacy
of corpus analysis in statutory interpretation since corpora are of
little use when a court determines that fidelity to a statute's purpose
should take priority over the ordinary meaning of its terms.
II. FINDING ORDINARY MEANING
Once a court determines that the ordinary meaning of a statute's
language should carry the day, it must determine which of the
alternative interpretations proposed by the parties is the "ordinary"
one. The task itself assumes that words have a single, ordinary
meaning and that, presumably, other meanings are outliers, perhaps
extraordinary meanings. Sometimes this presumption seems
reasonable. Returning to Chisom v. Roemer,'o for example, the term
representativereally is typically used to refer to legislators, and judges
are typically not referred to as representatives. In other instances,
however, it is not at all clear that one meaning is ordinary while
others are not." To make this determination requires the legal
system to reach an understanding of what makes ordinary meaning
ordinary. As Lee and Mouritsen'5 o observe, the system has not yet
done so.
Judges typically use three methods in determining the ordinary
meaning of a term: their own knowledge of the language,
dictionaries as a purportedly neutral source of information about
meaning, and empirical research using a corpus of English. As an

102. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
103. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
104. See discussion of Smith v. United States, supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
105. See Lee & Mouritsen, supranote 1.
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initial matter, even when a court decides that a statutory word
should be given a meaning that is broader or narrower than ordinary
usage, the court is likely to engage in ordinary meaning analysis as
part of the decision to look elsewhere. Thus, whatever method of
interpretation a court adopts, finding the ordinary meaning of a
term is likely to be part of the analysis in which the court engages.
A. Native Speaker Intuition
All of us use knowledge of our native language as our principal
interpretive tool. A colorful example came from the 1973 Watergate
hearings in which Senator Sam Ervin, Chair of the Senate Select
Committee, questioned President Nixon's Chief Domestic Advisor,
Mr. Ehrlichman.0' The questioning concerned the government's
having broken into the office of the psychiatrist treating Daniel
Ellsberg, the individual responsible for the public release of the
Pentagon Papers. 107
Senator Sam Ervin: The foreign intelligence activities had nothing
to do with the opinion of Ellsberg's psychiatrist about his
intellectual or emotional or psychological state.
John Ehrlichman: How do you know that, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Sam Ervin: Because I can understand the English
108
language. It's my mother tongue.
This process is good enough to get us through our lives every
day. In the realm of statutory interpretation, however, the task is not
limited to understanding the gist of what someone is saying but

106.

For discussion of Ehrlichman's positions in the Nixon Administration, see John D.

Ehrlichman, RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, https://www.nixonlibrary.

gov/forresearchers/find/textual/special/smof/ehrlichman.php (last visited Jan. 27, 2018).
107. The Pentagon Papers is the informal name given to a report of the U.S.
Department of Defense entitled United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: A Study
Prepared by the Department of Defense. It received notoriety because it contained facts and
explanations at odds with the public statements of President Johnson about U.S. involvement
in the Vietnam War. The Pentagon Papers are available at http://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/us/201 1PENTAGONPAPERS.html.
108. Video: U.S. Senator Sam Ervin, Jr., QuestionsJohnEhrlichman, an Aide to President
Richard Nixon, During the Televised Senate Watergate Hearings in 1973, BRITANNICA KIDS,
(last visited
http://kids.britannica.com/comptons/art-173893/US-Senator-Sam-Ervin-Jr
Jan. 27, 2018).
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requires making subtle line-drawing decisions about when one
category should end and another begin. Thus, the interpretation of
statutory language often involves judgments about far smaller
distinctions than everyday life demands.
Moreover, while people within a speech community' seem to
share intuitions about whether a sentence is grammatical or not,1 o
there seems to be far less consensus about facts concerning the
relative distribution of word usage. People are subject to what
psychologists have termed false consensus bias. We tend to assume
ourselves to be normal.
Solan, Rosenblatt, and Osherson studied false consensus bias as
applied to the interpretation of equivocal contract terms."' In one
scenario, participants in an experiment were asked whether they
believed that damage to property should be attributed to "earth
movement" when the damage was caused by the percussive force of
a neighbor's blasting activity as part of a construction project.11
Their responses varied: 40% said yes, 40% said no, and 20% said they
could not tell."' These same people were then told that 100 people
just like them had been asked these questions, and were asked to
estimate how many of those hundred agreed with their judgments.
The percentages were grossly overestimated: 67%, 63%, and 36%,
respectively."' Judges who participated in the study also exhibited

109. A speech community is a group of people who both speak the same language and
share norms for its usage. See Richard Norquist, Speech Community in Sociolinguistics, THOUGHTCO., https://www.thoughtco.com/speech-community-sociolinguistics-1692
120 (last updated Apr. 26, 2017). There is disagreement about how to define the term. For a
discussion of this topic, see generally Peter L. Patrick, The Speech Community, in THE
HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE VARIATION AND CHANGE 573 (J.K. Chambers et al. eds., 2002).
110. For recent research comparing the intuitions of linguists in professional journals

with survey data, see generally Kyle Mahowald et al., SNAP judgments: A Small N
Acceptability Paradigm (SNAP) for Linguistic Acceptability Judgments, 92 LANGUAGE 619

(2016); Jon Sprouse, Carson T. Schitze & Diogo Almeida, A Comparison of Informal and
Formal Acceptability Judgments Using a Random Sample from Linguistic Inquiry 2001-2010,
134 LINGUA 219 (2013); Jon Sprouse & Diogo Almeida, Assessing the Reliability of Textbook
Data in Syntax: Adger's Core Syntax, 48 J. LINGUISTICS 609 (2012).

111.

Lawrence Solan, Terri Rosenblatt & Daniel Osherson, False Consensus Bias in

ContractInterpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1268 (2008).

112.
113.

Id. at 1287-90.
Id. at 1290.

114.

Id.
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false consensus bias."' People tend to believe that their own
intuitions comport with those of others. Moreover, when false
consensus bias is added to the inevitable problem of confirmation
bias in substantive decision making,"' intuitive estimates of facts
about how word usage is distributed do not appear likely to be
very reliable.
B. Dictionaries
We will not belabor the fact that judicial reliance on dictionaries
has been the subject of sharp criticism by legal academics"' and, to
some extent, by judges themselves."' The biggest problem with
dictionaries is that, because they most often list meanings without
sufficient context, it is possible to select from among the reported
meanings without regard to whether that usage of the word is
appropriate in the context of the legal dispute at hand. Thus, there is
an incentive for judges to select dictionaries-and particular
definitions-in a manner that tends to support the position they are
taking. This incentive negates whatever objectivity there is in using a
dictionary as opposed to the judge's own sense of a word's meaning.
For example, consider MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
AT&T,"' which the Supreme Court decided in 1994. After the
1970s breakup of AT&T, which had a monopoly on telephone
service in the United States, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) began to implement regulations that would
remove barriers for new entrants into the market.' 20 The Federal

115. Id. at 1292.
116. For a good discussion of the confirmation bias, see generally Raymond S.
Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REv. GEN.
PSYCHOL. 175 (1998).
117. For an excellent review of this literature, see James Brudney & Lawrence Baum,
Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court's Thirstfor Dictionariesin the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras,
55 WM. & MARY L. REv. 483 (2013).
118. In cases discussed below, Judge Posner criticizes their use in United States v.
Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012) (summarizing literature critical of judicial
reliance on dictionaries to ascertain ordinary meaning, focusing on the gap between the
context-sensitive use of words, and the acontextual nature of dictionary definitions), as does
Associate Chief Justice Lee of the Supreme Court of Utah in State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72,
11 42-46, 356 P.3d 1258, 1272-73 (Lee, J., concurring).
119. MCI Telecomns. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
120. Id. at 220.
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Communications Act required telephone companies to publish a
complete listing of their ratesl 2 ' and not charge more than what they
published. At the time, telephone rates depended on the locations of
the caller and the recipient, so this requirement was a burdensome
one, especially for a company intending to operate nationwide. The
statute also permitted the FCC to "modify any requirement made by
or under the authority of this section either in particular instances or
by general order applicable to special circumstances or conditions."' 22
As part of its efforts to reduce entry barriers to new carriers, the
FCC "modified" the publication requirement by having it apply only
to "dominant carriers," as it defined the term.123 Because AT&T was
the only dominant carrier at the time, the change in regulation
would certainly serve the purpose of making it easier for competitors
to enter the telephone service market.
AT&T cried foul and sued, naming MCI as one of the nondominant carriers that benefitted from the new regulations.' 24 The
case made its way to the Supreme Court, which ruled in favor of
AT&T by a 5-3 vote.' 2 ' The decision hinged on whether the FCC
had exceeded its statutory authority by eliminating the publication
requirement for a subset of the carriers.126
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia combined etymology and
lexicography to argue that modify must describe only incremental
changes, not wholesale elimination:
The word "modify"-like a number of other English words
employing the root "mod-" (deriving from the Latin word for
"measure"), such as "moderate," "modulate," "modest," and
"modicum"-has a connotation of increment or limitation.

121. Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2012).
122. 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2). The Supreme Court describes the history of these new
regulations in MCI Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 221.
123. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 220-21.
124. Id. at 221. Of course, AT&T's dispute was with the FCC, not MCI, which merely
took advantage of the regulations that had been put in place. Various provisions of the Federal
Communications Act permitted MCI to be brought into the case as a party.
125. Id. at 213.
126. Id. at 225.

1335

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2017

Virtually every dictionary we are aware of says that "to modify"
means to change moderately or in minor fashion.'27
He went on to cite numerous dictionaries and to berate the
dissenting justices for relying on Webster's Third, which includes
making "a basic or important change" in its definition.1 28
We present this extensive detail because the case illustrates what
is generally problematic when courts rely on dictionaries to
determine a word's ordinary meaning. Scalia framed the issue as
whether modify ordinarily describes an incremental change, rather
than a major change. Dictionaries do not typically contextualize their
definitions, so it should come as no surprise that it would have an
answer that supports the majority's position.
The decision to frame the issue as such, however, is not a
necessary one. Scalia characterized the FCC as having eliminated the
publication requirement, thus making a major change. It is possible,
however, to understand the new regulations as leaving the
publication requirement as it was but adjusting the population to
which it applied. To illustrate, if a high school requires all students to
have lunch on campus, the principal might announce that the rule
has been "modified" by permitting seniors to have their lunch off
campus.' 2 9 We recognize that one may decide that eliminating the
publication requirement for all but a single actor is more than a
modification. Our point here, however, is that dictionary definitions
are not likely to be of much help in cases like this, in which the
linguistic dispute is subtler than are the lexicographers' decisions
about how to word the definitions, or perhaps the publishing
company's policies.
III. TURNING TO CORPORA
With the risks of overstating the "ordinariness" of one's own
intuitions and keeping the limitations of dictionaries in mind, some
judges have begun to turn to big data to determine ordinary
meaning.' 0 Below we discuss four cases in which courts turned to

127.
128.
129.
130.
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corpora to determine the likely meaning intended by the legislature.
For each of these cases, we determine the extent to which the four
conditions set forth in our introduction for optimal corpus analysis
are present. Where we discover gaps, we point out the uncertainty in
meaning left unaddressed. First, though, we present a brief
introduction to corpus linguistics to provide context for readers not
trained in its methods.
A. A Brief Introduction to Corpus Linguistics
Corpus linguistics is an empirical approach to the study of
language variation and use "resulting in research findings which have
much greater generalizability and validity than would otherwise be
feasible.""' Its two primary goals are "assessing the extent to which a
[linguistic] pattern is found" and "analyzing the contextual features
that influence [linguistic] variability."' 32 For the past few decades,
corpus methods have been revolutionizing all branches of linguistics
and, more recently, providing more scientifically grounded insights
into the study of language in forensic and legal contexts.
A corpus is a large collection of naturally occurring texts that are
sampled to be representative of a particular type of language
variety."' There are two basic types of corpora: general and
specialized. General corpora-sometimes called reference corporaare large (frequently millions to billions of words) and usually aim to
capture a range of registers that are representative of a common
language variety."'
Specialized corpora are typically smaller
(frequently thousands to millions of words) and focus on a more
specific or less accessible variety of language."'

&

131. Douglas Biber, Corpus-Based and Corpus-Driven Analyses of Language Variation
and Use, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 193, 193 (Bernd Heine
Heiko Narrog eds., 2012).
132. DOUGLAS BIBER, SUSAN CONRAD & RANDI REPPEN, CORPUS LINGUISTICS:
INVESTIGATING LANGUAGE STRUCTURE AND USE 3 (1998).
133. TONY McENERY ET AL., CORPUS-BASED LANGUAGE STUDIES: AN ADVANCED
RESOURCE BOOK 4 (2006).

134. For an excellent discussion of representativeness in corpus design in this volume, see
James C. Phillips & Jesse Egbert, A Concise How-to-Guide for Law and Corpus Linguistics:
Importing Principles and Practicesfrom Survey and Content-Analysis Methodologies to Improve
Corpus Design and Analysis, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1589.
135. MCENERY ETAL., supra note 133, at 15.
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'

Examples of general corpora include Brigham Young University's
Corpus of Historical American English (COHA), Corpus of Global
Web-based English (GloWbE), and Corpus of Contemporary
American English (COCA), the last of which is probably the bestknown, publicly available reference corpus and comprises 520
million words from 1990 to 2015, balanced over five registers (one
spoken and four written)."' Examples of specialized corpora include
the Blog Authorship Corpus (BAC),"m the Communicated Threat
Assessment Reference Corpus (CTARC),"' the Enron Email
Dataset/Corpus," 9 and BYU's Corpus of U.S. Supreme Court
Opinions (COSCOTUS).'"
The creation and use of corpora are not new phenomena. Early
field anthropologists and lexicographers used to collect individual
words on slips of paper, documenting their origin, date of
acquisition, meaning, and, occasionally, the context in which they
were used.14 ' These "shoebox" corpora were the basis for some of
the first English dictionaries that included contextual information
about a word: Charles Richardson's New Dictionary of the English
Language (1837) and James Murray's subsequent twelve-volume
New English Dictionary on Historical Principles(1884-1928)-now
better-known as the Oxford English Dictionary, or the OED.1 4
These early corpora gave lexicographers observable evidence to
provide more information about a word's origin, sense
differentiation, and examples of use in context.

136.

See CORPUS.BYU.EDU, http://corpus.byu.edu/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2018); CORPUS

CONT. AM. ENG., http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2018).
137. BLOG AUTHORSHIP CORPUS, http://u.cs.biu.ac.il/-koppel/BlogCorpus.htm (last
visited Jan. 27, 2018).
138. Tammy Gales, Ideologies of Violence: A Corpus and Discourse Analytic Approach
to Stance in Threatening Communications (June 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of California, Davis).
139.

ENRON

EMAIL

DATASET,

http://www.cs.cmu.edu/-enron/

(last visited

Jan.

27, 2018).
140.

CORPUS U.S. SUP. CT. OPINIONS, http://corpus.byu.edu/scotus/ (last visited Jan.

27, 2018).
141. MCENERY ET AL., supra note 133, at 3; M.A.K. Halliday, Lexicology, in
LEXICOLOGY AND CORPUS LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 1, 14 (M.A.K Halliday et al.

eds., 2004).
142. Halliday, supra note 141, at 15.
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In the 1960s, what is considered the first modern corpus was
released: the Brown University Standard Corpus of Present-day
American English, which sampled 500 chunks of 2000 words, each
from texts from fifteen categories such as press reportage, religion,
popular lore, mystery fiction, and humor."' With continuing
advances in computer technology, in 1987, John Sinclair at the
University of Birmingham, United Kingdom, published the first fully
corpus-based dictionary, COBUILD, which was based on the Bank
of English corpus.'" And, in 1999, the first fully corpus-based
grammar to highlight register variation was published: the Longman
Grammar of Spoken and Written English, which was based entirely
on the forty-million-word Longman Spoken and Written English
Since then, the number and size of corpora have
Corpus.'
increased and represent a range of written and spoken global
language varieties.
There are now many ways in which general and specialized
corpora are being compiled.'" Corpora can be diachronic or
synchronic. Diachronic corpora include similar kinds of texts across a
range of time periods, allowing for investigations of language use
and change over time. Synchronic corpora, on the other hand,
include texts from a single time period, allowing for closer
comparisons of language varieties within that time frame. Two wellknown examples of diachronic, or historical, corpora are A
Representative Corpus of Historical English Registers (ARCHER)a 1.8 million-word corpus of British and American English from a
range of genres from 1650 to 1990' 4 7-and the Diachronic Part of
the Helsinki Corpus of English Texts (the Helsinki corpus)-a 1.5
million word collection of Old to Early Modern English from the

143. McENERY ET AL., supra note 133, at 4, 61-62.
144. Wolfgang Teubert, Languageand Corpus Linguistics, in LEXICOLOGY AND CORPUS
LINGUISTICS, supranote 141, at 73, 111.
145. DOUGLAS BIBERETAL., LONGMAN GRAMMAROF SPOKEN AND WRITTEN ENGLISH

4 (1999).
146. For an up-to-date compilation of corpus tools, corpora, and corpus research, see
Martin Weisser's CORPUS-BASED LINGUISTICS LINKS, http://martinweisser.org/corpora

site/CBLLinks.html

(last updated Oct. 14, 2016) (formerly David Lee's Corpus-based

Resources). The website also contains additional information for corpora in other languages and

language varieties (e.g., learner, multilingual, and parallel corpora). Id.
147. See id.
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eighth to eighteenth centuries."' A third example is BYU's soon-tobe released Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA),
which will include at least 100 million words from a range of
registers from 1760 to 1799.149 A popular collection of synchronic
corpora is the International Corpus of English (ICE), which
currently consists of one-million-word corpora sampled from similar
registers and time periods from twenty-three different Englishspeaking countries, such as Canada, Fiji, India, Ireland, Malta, New
Zealand, Nigeria, and South Africa, making comparative studies
across language varieties possible."so
Corpora can also be described as sample (or static) corpora or
monitor corpora. Sample corpora are compiled once (whether
diachronic or synchronic) and then no texts are added after the
completion date, i.e., their size remains the same. The Brown and
Frown corpora of American English and LOB/FLOB corpora of
British English are good examples of sample corpora."' Each of the
four corpora contains approximately one million words from a
variety of registers of written English, with texts for Brown and LOB
having been published in 1961 and texts for Frown and FLOB in
1991. Monitor corpora, on the other hand, continually grow in size
at regular intervals, allowing researchers to monitor language change
across time periods in a dynamic manner. Examples include BYU's
News on the Web (NOW) corpus-with five to six million words
added from web-based newspapers and magazines every day' 52-and
the previously mentioned COCA, with twenty million words per
each of five registers added every year."5

148.

See Helsinki Corpus of English Texts, VARIENG,

http://www.helsinki.fi/varieng

&

/CoRD/corpora/HelsinkiCorpus/ (last updated Oct. 14, 2011).
149. See James C. Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics
Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J.F.
21, 31 (2016).
150.

See The InternationalCorpus of English, UCL SURV. ENG. USAGE, http://www.ucl

.ac.uk/english-usage/projects/ice.htm (last updated Dec. 1, 2016).
151.
152.

McENERY ET AL., supra note 133, at 15.
See NOW CORPUS (NEWS ON WEB), https://corpus.byu.edu/now/ (last visited

Jan. 27, 2018).
153.

27, 2018).
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Corpus research over the past few decades has revealed 1) the
extensive variation that exists in the use of features across different
genres and registers;' 54 2) has highlighted the contextuallydependent nature of meaning, demonstrating how, instead of being
located within individual words in a text, it is distributed within and
across texts through prosodic collocations of features;' 5 and 3) has
emphasized the importance of testing intuitions about patterns of
language structure and use within corpora. This is because:
each of us has only a partial knowledge of the language, we have
prejudices and preferences, our memory is weak, our imagination is
powerful (so we can conceive of possible contexts for the most
implausible utterances), and we tend to notice unusual words or
structures but often overlook ordinary ones.
This has led to two distinct but complementary approaches to
the study of language structure and use: corpus-based and corpusdriven."' While both approaches are empirical and based on
observations of large quantities of language data, corpus-based
studies start with individual hypotheses about specific linguistic
features and then examine how those features are distributed and
function within a corpus; corpus-driven studies allow the linguistic
features of interest to emerge from the corpus itself.' Thus, posing
appropriate questions of the corpora, examining empirical evidence
arising from the results, and integrating both complementary
approaches results in a more well-rounded examination of language
data that may otherwise be overlooked.s' These issues are discussed
in the case descriptions below.

154.

See BIBER, CONRAD & REPPEN, supra note 132.

155.

See Teubert, supra note 144, at 73.

156. Ramesh Krishnamurthy, Collocation: From 'Silly Ass" to Lexical Sets, in WORDS IN
CONTEXT: A TRIBUTE TO JOHN SINCLAIR ON HIS RETIREMENT 32-33 (Chris Heffer et al.

eds., 2000).
157. See generally ELENA TOGNINI-BONELLI, CORPUS LINGUISTICS AT WORK (2001).
For a critique of the division of these approaches, see MCENERY ET AL, supra note 133.

See Biber, supra note 131.
See Richard Xiao, Theory-Driven Corpus Research: Using Corpora to Inform Aspect

Theory, in CORPUS LINGUISTICS: AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK 987 (Anke Llideling

&

158.
159.

Merja Kyt eds., 2008).
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B. FourConditions that Make CorpusAnalysis Efficacious in
Legal Analysis
As we noted in the Introduction to this Article, the use of corpus
analysis in legal argumentation is most efficacious when certain
conditions hold."' In this section, we discuss those conditions in
greater detail.
1. The legal issue in the case must concern the distributionof language
usage over a particularpopulation
We have already discussed the fact that ordinary meaning is not
the universal standard in cases of statutory interpretation."' Rather,
it is a default rule that can be overridden when the particular
circumstances of a case suggest the legislature had a broader or
narrower meaning in mind. Different judges have different
thresholds when it comes to determining when the ordinary
meaning of a term should not predominate. As the sharp debates
among the Justices reveal, the central issue is the extent to which a
court investigates the circumstances surrounding a law's enactment,
draws inferences as to what the law was intended to accomplish, and
decides whether the "ordinary meaning" of the language in the law
is either too narrow or too broad to accomplish those goals. The
cases discussed above in section I.B illustrate the lack of consensus
on these important methodological issues.
2. The court must adopt a clear notion of ordinarymeaning
By the same token, when ordinary meaning does prevail, the
court must decide what ordinary meaning means.' 62 There are many
ways to address this question. Preliminarily, we wish to draw a
what
makes
concepts
of
two
distinction
between
meaning "ordinary."
Ordinary Meaning I ("OMI"): The ordinary meaning of a term

is a description of the circumstances in which the term is most
likely to be used.
160.
161.
162.
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Ordinary Meaning 2 ("OM2"): The ordinary meaning of a term
is a description of the circumstances in which members of a
relevant speech community would express comfort in using the
term to describe the circumstances. More than one meaning may
be ordinary for a term under this theory.
We believe that each of these meanings of ordinary meaning may
have its place in legal analysis. When a term has distinct senses, it
makes sense to ask whether one of them predominates in ordinary
usage, and an appropriate corpus provides a good tool for
performing this comparison. OM1 invites this inquiry.
In contrast, how should courts view ordinary meaning when the
issue in a case is whether a single sense of a word can be used in its
ordinary sense in two distinct but related circumstances? When a
term can be used in distinct but highly related circumstances, OM2
may tell us that both circumstances may be considered ordinary.
A disagreement between Justices Breyer and Ginsburg over these
two notions of ordinary meaning took place in Muscarello v. United
States."' The law in dispute called for an enhanced sentence for the
perpetrator who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation
to" "a drug trafficking crime."'" Muscarello had drugs in one part
of his car and a gun in another, as he drove to a drug deal he was
planning to make."' The nine justices agreed that the issue in the
case was whether he had "carried" a firearm in the ordinary sense,"
but they disagreed by five to four on which meaning was the
ordinary one. Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer held that
Muscarello had done so.'" Much of the decision'" (and Justice
Ginsburg's dissent') focused on a battle over which dictionaries
should be considered authoritative. Additional arguments were
adduced based on etymology,' the use of carry one way or the
other in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century literature"' and in the

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2012).
Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 127.
Id. at 127-28, 139.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 142-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 128 (majority opinion).
Id. at 129.
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Bible,1 72 and the order of definitions in dictionaries, even the Oxford
English Dictionary'7 1 in which the order of definitions is historical
and not a matter of most common usage.'" Based on this process,
Breyer determined that the ordinary meaning of carry a firearm
includes carrying the firearm in a vehicle and that carrying a gun on
one's person is a "special" use of the term. 7 1
In addition, Breyer conducted a search of items found in Lexis
and Westlaw news libraries, using the words carry and weapon in
close proximity:
We looked for sentences in which the words "carry," "vehicle," and
"weapon" (or variations thereof) all appear. We found thousands of
such sentences, and random sampling suggests that many, perhaps
more than one-third, are sentences used to convey the meaning at
issue here, i.e., the carrying of guns in a car.17
Not surprisingly, Justice Ginsburg retorted in dissent: "One is
left to wonder what meaning showed up some two-thirds of
the time."'"7

This exchange, short as it is, illustrates the lack of consensus
about what makes ordinary meaning ordinary. Although Breyer's
analysis may suggest that both meanings are acceptable, he remained
committed to an OMI analysis, not acknowledging that the onethird rate of occurrence may suggest to others that more than one
meaning is available. Ginsburg's response, without actually taking
the position that the meaning most commonly instantiated should
prevail, at least suggests that looking at the data more closely is a
reasonable approach.

7

1

172. Id.
173. Id. at 128; see Mouritsen, Dictionary, supra note 1, at 1934.
174. See John Simpson, Preface to the Third Edition of the OED, OxFORD ENG.
DICTIONARY (March 2000), http://public.oed.com/the-oed-today/preface-to-the-thirdedition-of-the-oed/.
175. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128.
176. Id. at 129.
177. Id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
178. Id.
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3. Conducting the right search on the right corpus
There is a second problem with the use of the corpus to
determine ordinary meaning in Muscarello. As Stephen Mouritsen
points out, Breyer conducted the wrong search.' 79 Ginsburg's quip in
dissent misses this point as well. What matters is not the relative
frequency with which carry a weapon suggests carrying it in a vehicle
when the word vehicle is mentioned but rather the relative frequency
with which carry a weapon suggests carrying it in a vehicle whether
or not the word vehicle is mentioned. After all, the statute itself says
nothing about vehicles.
Mouritsen conducted two sets of searches in COCA.' 0 The first
set of searches picked out only uses of the verb to carry.'8 Mouritsen
analyzed a sample of 500 of them.'82 Many had nothing to do with
the issues in Muscarello, with uses such as "my cable service doesn't
carry CNBC.""' Of those that involved a person carrying an object,
85% involved carrying something on one's person; the remaining
15% involved carrying something in some kind of vehicle or on
an animal.'
More pointedly, Mouritsen also looked at instances in which
carry is used in proximity to words denoting various weapons:
firearm, gun, handgun, rifle, and pistol.'" He found that carry was
clearly meant to describe carrying a weapon on one's person 64% of
the time, clearly used to describe carrying the weapon in a vehicle 3%
of the time, and either ambiguous between the two or referring to
neither the rest of the time.' 6 From these results, Mouritsen infers
that Breyer was incorrect in asserting that carrying a gun on one's
person embraces an unusual or "special" meaning of the term and
that a broader meaning, at the very least, is included in the norm."'

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See Mouritsen, Dictionary, supra note 1, at 1948.
Id. at 1958.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1961.
Id. at 1963.
Id. at 1965.
Id. at 1927-28.
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We do not believe that this ends the matter, however. For just as
law contains defeasible default rules, so does language. Linguists
speak of "the unmarked case" as the default case.'" This may reflect
syntactic choices, as illustrated below.
"Bill likes to sip iced tea after a long day of construction work."
"After a long day of construction work, Bill likes to sip iced tea."

Although we are comfortable with both sentences, it makes sense
to conclude that the default phrasal order in English has the
temporal phrase coming after the main clause because the temporal
phrase modifies the verb phrase semantically.
When it comes to meaning, we can say that the unmarked
meaning of an expression is the way it would ordinarily be
understood without further modification. Consider:
"In my state, it is legal to carry a weapon openly on campus."

We believe that most people would understand this sentence as
referring to carrying a weapon on one's person in plain sight. Of
course, one can modify the sentence:
"In my state, it is legal to carry a weapon in one's automobile while
driving on campus."

Without this modification, we assume the default interpretation.
For this reason, we share Mouritsen's surprise that Justice Breyer's
search yielded only about one-third instances in which a weapon was
being carried in a vehicle. We would have expected the modification
of carry by vehicle to have yielded higher numbers.
This leads us to a final point: The ordinary way to carry a pistol
may well be on one's person, but the ordinary way to carry an army
tank is, perhaps, in a cargo plane. And the ordinary way to carry a
canon is in some other vehicle, the nature of which has changed over
the centuries. All of this suggests a different analysis. Perhaps there
are not two separate senses of to carry when used to describe people
moving something from one place to another. Perhaps there is only a
single sense, but as a default we assume that a sentence using the

188. See EDWARD FINEGAN, LANGUAGE: ITS STRUCTURE AND USE 196-97 (6th
ed. 2012).
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verb describes the most natural way of carrying whatever the direct
object is unless a different mode is specified.
If this indeed is how we use the word carry in everyday speech,
what does it say about corpus analysis as a means for resolving a legal
dispute? If six members of a gang drive to a drug deal in a van
loaded with large firearms and come out shooting, we would
probably say that this statute applies to them. Muscarello's activities,
in contrast, are less clear. We can certainly say that he carried the gun
in his car. But if we simply say that he "carried a gun to a drug deal,"
we are most likely to assume that he had the gun on his person. The
legislature could have clarified the statute by adding "on his person,
in a vehicle, or otherwise," to carry, but it did not do so.
When it comes to weapons whose sizes permit carrying them
either in a vehicle or on one's person, in most instances, the word
carry is used to describe carrying the weapon on one's person. This
is the result of an OMI analysis,' although it comes out exactly the
opposite of Justice Breyer's OM1 analysis. An OM2 analysis, in
contrast, asks only if there are enough instances of both meanings to
demonstrate that speakers are relatively comfortable using the term
both ways, regardless of distributional facts between them. In about
one-third of the occurrences in Mouritsen's analysis it is not possible
to tell how the weapon was being carried."' Thus, it appears to us
that people are generally comfortable using the verb to carry to
denote carrying an object in a vehicle. As noted, however, for small
objects, the default interpretation is that it is being carried on
one's person.
This leaves a sufficient measure of uncertainty about meaning to
trigger the rule of lenity, in our opinions. That rule resolves
uncertainty in the interpretation of criminal statutes in favor of the
defendant. From the language of the statute alone, it is not possible
to determine whether Congress had in mind enhancing the sentence
of those who carried a firearm with them into the actual drug
transaction, or whether the law was intended to apply more broadly
to those who brought firearms with them in their vehicles but left

189. See supratext accompanying note 152.
190. Mouritsen, Dictionary, supra note 1.
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the weapons there during the transaction itself. Ginsburg relies on
this principle, in part, in her dissent.1 9 1
In 2016, the Supreme Court of Michigan decided People v.
Harris.'9 2 The question in Harriswas whether police officers who

had

testified

falsely

in

a disciplinary

hearing

had

provided

'

"information" in that hearing. A Michigan law, the Disclosures by
Law Enforcement Officers Act (DLEOA), immunizes information
testified to in such contexts from use in a subsequent criminal
prosecution.' 9 3 The purpose of the law is to enable the state to
compel the testimony of law enforcement officers in disciplinary
proceedings without violating their constitutional right to refrain
from providing self-incriminating testimony that can be used against
them in a criminal case. 9 4
Three officers were present at a traffic stop; one of them
assaulted the driver without adequate cause while the others
watched.' 95 The officers testified falsely in their disciplinary hearings,
not knowing that someone had made a video recording of the entire
incident.'
The officers were subsequently prosecuted for
obstruction of justice.'9" All seven justices on the court were
comfortable using COCA to ascertain the ordinary meaning of
information.'" However, they divided four to three on the outcome
of the case.' 99 The disagreement among the justices arose from
deciding which corpus analysis should be conducted. The majority
correctly pointed out that information can be used with modifiers
such as false and inaccurateto denote false statements.2 ' It held that
the word information can be used to describe both truthful and false
statements, making the officers' false testimony inadmissible.2 0
Objecting to the dissenters' position that information when not

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
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modified is almost always used to describe truthful statements, the
majority remarked:
Empirical data from the COCA, however, demonstrates the
opposite. In common usage, "information" is regularly used in
conjunction with adjectives suggesting it may be both true and
false. This strongly suggests that the unmodified word
"information," can describe either true or false statements.
Moreover, by reading each identified use of the word
"information" in its surrounding context, it is clear that
"information" is often used to describe false statements. Quite
simply, "information" in common parlance describes perceptions
conveyed about the world around us, which may be true or false.202
But as the dissenting justices pointed out, a COCA search
revealed that without modification, information is generally used to
denote accurate information, rejecting the majority's conclusion that
the presence of veracity adjectives in both directions indicates that
the unmodified form of the noun can be understood equally
both ways.2
Making matters more uncertain, we do not know whether the
legislature intended to use the term to cover the word regardless of
modification, or whether the bare word, as it appears, was meant to
be understood that way. In this sense, Harrisresembles Muscarello in
the statute's lack of clarity.
In United States v. Costello,204 following his criticism of excessive
reliance on dictionaries, Judge Posner used a Google News search to
determine that a woman did not "harbor" her boyfriend, an
undocumented immigrant, in violation of a federal statute, by
allowing him to live with her, at least not if the court relied upon the
205
ordinary meaning of the verb to harbor.
Posner reported the results of a search he conducted, showing
what words most frequently co-occur with harbor (called
"collocates"
in the language
of corpus linguistics and

202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 839.
Id. at 850 n.14 (Markman, J., concurring & dissenting).
United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1044, 1050.
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lexicography)."' There were thousands of hits for harboring Jews,
enemies, Quakers, refugees and fugitives, but few or none for
harboring victims or guests.2 0 ' Posner concluded:
It is apparent from these results that "harboring," as the word is
actually used, has a connotation-which "sheltering," and afortiori
"giving a person a place to stay"-does not, of deliberately
safeguarding members of a specified group from the authorities,
whether through concealment, movement to a safe location, or
physical protection. This connotation enables one to see that the
emergency staff at the hospital may not be "harboring" an alien
when it renders emergency treatment even if he stays in the
emergency room overnight, that giving a lift to a gas station to an
alien with a flat tire may not be harboring, that driving an alien to
the local office of the Department of Homeland Security to apply
for an adjustment of status to that of lawful resident may not be
harboring, that inviting an alien for a "one night stand" may not be
attempted harboring, that placing an illegal alien in a school may
not be harboring, and finally that allowing your boyfriend to live
with you may not be harboring, even if you know he shouldn't be
in the United States.208
Lee and Mouritsen criticize 'Posner's use of Google in part
because Google does not publish its algorithm for obtaining hits and
is therefore not transparent.2 0 9 Moreover, Google searches only
contemporaneous web pages and there is no basis for concluding
that counting appearances on the web accurately reflects ordinary
meaning in broader contexts.2 1 0 On the plus side, Posner's search
comports with linguistic literature showing that some expressions
have semantic prosody, that is positive or negative connotations that
do not typically make their way into dictionary definitions.2 1 1 In our
opinions, while the criticism of Posner's choice of corpus is valid, his

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 1044.
Id.
Id. at 1044-45 (citations omitted).
See Lee and Mouritsen, supra note 1.
See id.
Michael Stubbs, QuantitativeDataon Multi-Word Sequences in English The Case of

the Word World, in TExT, DIsCOURSE AND CORPORA: THEORY AND ANALYSiS 163 (Michael

Hoey et al. eds., 2007).
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analysis is sufficiently robust as to put the burden on critics to argue
that a better corpus analysis would yield different results.
4. Caution in drawing inferencesfrom the absence ofparticularusages
in a corpus: the merits of double dissociation
When a particular usage appears frequently in a corpus, it is
reasonable to infer that the speakers or writers whose language has
been recorded are comfortable using the term in the way the corpus
instantiates. In contrast, as noted in the introduction to this Article,
the absence of data in the corpus may reflect a linguistic fact-a
usage is absent because people do not use the term that way-or a
fact about the world-people may express a concept in a way not
present in the corpus but just do not talk about such a thing much,
and for that reason, it does not show up in the corpus.
Consider first the classic 1892 case, Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States. 212 A law made it illegal to:
[I]n any manner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in
any way assist or encourage the importation or migration, of any
alien or aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, into the United
States,

...

under contract or agreement, . . . made previous to the

importation or migration of such alien or aliens, foreigner or
foreigners, to perform labor or service of any kind in the
United States ...
213
A wealthy church in Manhattan had paid for the transportation

of its new rector from England to New York and was prosecuted for
having violated the law. 214 The Supreme Court ruled unanimously
that the statute did not apply to these facts. 215 This case has remained
controversial for 125 years since its publication in part because of its
reliance on legislative history to determine the intent of the
legislature 216 and in part because of its reliance on "the spirit" of the

212. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
213. Id. at 458.
214. Id. at 457-58.
215. Id. at 472.
216. Carol Chornsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History
in Statutory Interpretation,100 COLUM. L. REv. 901, 905 (2000).

1351

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2017

statute.2 1 7 V at often goes unnoticed in discussions of this case is
that, in many respects, it is a paradigmatic case about ordinary
meaning. The title of the act was: "An act to prohibit the
importation and migration of foreigners and aliens under contract or
agreement to perform labor in the United States, its Territories and
the District of Columbia." 2 18 Taking advantage of the fact that the
title does not mention performing service, whereas the body of the
statute does, Justice Brewer remarked in his opinion:
Obviously the thought expressed in this reaches only to the work of
the manual laborer, as distinguished from that of the professional
man. No one reading such a.title would suppose that Congress had
in its mind any purpose of staying the coming into this country of
ministers of the gospel, or, indeed, of any class whose toil is that of
the brain. The common understanding of the terms labor and
laborers does not include preaching and preachers; and it is to be
assumed that words and phrases are used in their ordinary
meaning. So whatever of light is thrown upon the statute by the
language of the title indicates an exclusion from its penal provisions
of all contracts for the employment of ministers, rectors,
and pastors.2 9
Thus, putting the spirit of the law aside, Brewer argued that it is
unnatural to consider members of the clergy as performing "labor,"
even though it is possible to acknowledge that they do so by using
an expansive concept of what constitutes "labor." In many ways,
Brewer's argument in Holy Trinity Church presages Scalia's ordinary
meaning argument in his dissenting opinion in Chisom v. Roemer,2 2 0
the Voting Rights Act case discussed above.
Now let us return to Smith v. United States, 221 the case in which a
majority of six Supreme Court justices ruled that a person who
traded an unloaded machine gun for cocaine was subject to a harsher

217. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 19-20 (1998). The
offending sentence in the opinion is "It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter
of the statute and yet not within the statute because not within its spirit nor within the
intention of its makers." Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459.
218. Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 463.
219. Id.
220. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
221. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
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sentence by virtue of having "used a firearm during and in relation
to a drug trafficking crime."222 Scalia's colorful dissent ridiculed the
majority for confusing ordinarymeaning with some possible meaning.
Scalia was right that when we think of using a gun we think of using
it as a weapon.223 No doubt a COCA search would show many more
instances of use and gun collocating when the gun was being used as
a weapon than as an object of value to be bartered.
But the majority was also right to say that, given what Smith did,
it does not sound strange to describe his activity as using a gun even
if it is an unusual way to use a gun. That is, Scalia engaged in an
OMI analysis while the majority engaged in an OM2 analysis. In
cases like Chisolm and Church of the Holy Trinity, they will produce
the same result. In both of those cases, the reason that representative
and labor are used principally, as the Court describes, is because the
relevant terms are not generally used to convey the alternative
meaning (judge as representativeor clergyman as laborer).
We believe that the most efficient way to demonstrate that a
corpus analysis is uncovering a linguistic regularity, rather than the
mere fact that some things are spoken about less frequently than are
others, is to demonstrate that the circumstances described by the
infrequently used term are present in the corpus but spoken about
differently. For example, if there had been a dispute about whether
judicial elections are within the ordinary meaning of elections of
"representatives" in Chisolm, it would be possible to show not only
that election, judge, and representative do not show up together in
the corpus with any regularity but also that judicial elections are
described using different language when discussed.
The argument is akin to the double dissociation sometimes used
in brain studies involving language deficits.224 For example, we know
that damage to the Broca's area of the brain affects the ability to

222. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2012). The same statute was at issue in Muscarello. The law
makes it a crime to "use or carry" a firearm in the context of a drug trafficking crime.
223. See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 404 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia's dissent was also more
like the unanimous decision in Church of the Holy Trinity than he would have wished. Both
employed strong arguments based on ordinary usage. For further discussion, see SOLAN, supra
note 14.
224. For seminal work on double dissociation, see A.R. LUIuA, RESTORATION OF
FUNCTION AFTER BRAIN INJURY (O.L. Zangwill ed., Basil Haigh trans., 1963).
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speak fluidly but does not affect comprehension. Damage to the
Wernicke's area of the brain does just the opposite.22
Correspondingly, the strongest corpus arguments occur when not
only one usage predominates over another in the corpus but when,
in addition, the circumstances describable in the infrequently
instantiated case are present in the corpus but described using other
language. Using a combination of corpus-based and corpus-driven
approaches will help reveal such variation in use.
We similarly caution against inferring that a prototypical use of
an expression is necessarily the most frequently occurring usage.22
The giraffe is the prototypical tall animal, not because we speak more
of giraffes in that regard than we do, say, of camels, but because
giraffes have the essential feature of tallness to an unusual extent
among animals. Double dissociation can serve to reduce the
likelihood of this false inference as well.
C. Getting it Right
Let us now turn to a case in which the four conditions are met.
Here, we focus on Associate Chief Justice Lee's concurring opinion
22 7
which, like
in the Utah Supreme Court case, State v. Rasabout,
Harris, relied on a corpus analysis using COCA. Justice Lee had
been a full-time law professor at BYU before his appointment to the
bench and is familiar with how to conduct a corpus analysis. The
legal issue, as the justices taking different positions agreed, was the
ordinary meaning of the word discharge.22 8
Andy Rasabout was a gang member. He fired twelve rounds
from a semiautomatic weapon at a house and car as he drove by. 2 29 A
jury convicted him of twelve separate offenses; however, the trial
court merged them into one count of "discharg[ing] a dangerous
225. LANGUAGE FILES: MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE AND
LINGUISTICS 360 (Anouschka Bergmann et al. eds., 10th ed. 2007).
226. Carissa Hessick also makes this point in her contribution to this volume. Carissa
Byrne Hessick, Corpus Linguistics and the CriminalLaw, 2017 BYU L. REV. _; see Elizabeth
B. Lynch, John D. Coley & Douglas L. Medin, Tall is Typical: Central Tendency, Ideal
Dimensions, and Graded Category Structure Among Tree Experts, 28 MEMORY & COGNITION

41 (2000).
227. State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, 356 P.3d 1258.
228. Id. ¶¶ 5-6, 356 P.3d at 1261.
229. Id.
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weapon

or

firearm

from

an

automobile . ..

without

written

permission, within 600 feet of a house, dwelling or other
building."23 The appellate court reversed, reinstating the jury
verdict,231 and the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the appellate
court's decision.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Parrish, held that "the
allowable unit of prosecution for the unlawful-discharge-of-a-firearm
statute . . . is each discrete shot."232 In so holding, the court relied
on the morphology of the word discharge (dis + charge), various
dictionaries, the statutory definition of firearm ("any device . .
from which is expelled a projectile by action of an explosive"),233 the
purpose of the statute, and the whole act rule.234
Associate Chief Justice Thomas Lee concurred, applying corpus
linguistic methodology to the analysis. 23 5 He remarked:
I would interpret the terms of the statute by looking for real-world
examples of its key words in actual written language in its native
context. This sort of analysis has a fancy name-corpus linguistics.
But it is hardly unusual. We often resolve problems of ambiguity by
thinking of examples of the use of a given word or phrase in a
particular linguistic context. I propose to do that (as I have in a
couple of prior opinions) on a systematic scale-by computer-aided
searches of online databases in an effort to assemble a greater
236
number of examples than I can summon by memory on my own.
Justice Lee's COCA search found a substantial predominance of
examples in which discharge was used to mean "to shoot" in the
sense of the majority opinion.2 1 Justice Lee therefore concluded that
the ordinary meaning of the verb is "to shoot," even though it has
other meanings, and concurred in the judgment based largely on his
corpus analysis. In doing so, he noted that the majority had ignored

230. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-508 (West 2016).
231. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, 11, 356 P.3d at 1261.
232. Id. ¶15, 356 P.3d. at 1263.
233. Id. 1¶ 12-13, 356 P.3d at 1263-64.
234. Id.
235. See id. ¶ 40, 356 P.3d at 1271 (Lee, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment).
236. Id. ¶ 41, 356 P.3d at 1271.
237. Id. ¶¶ 81-93, 356 P.3d at 1281-82.
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the second definition (which would have assisted the defendant's
case). 238 Rather, the majority had relied on its own intuitions about
which meaning is ordinary, without adequate inquiry. Instead, he
argued, the court should take on the burden of acknowledging
both definitions and coming to a reasoned decision based on
empirical investigation as to which one reflects the verb's most
ordinary sense.239
Our only quibble with Justice Lee's analysis is that his argument
would have been even stronger if he had double dissociated by
showing that COCA contains examples of the verb to empty to
express the meaning of discharge proposed by the defendant. Our
own search shows this to be the case. COCA contains five instances
of emptying a weapon and thirty-three of emptying a gun. Almost all
of these were used to express the meaning of discharge that means
emptying a gun completely.240
IV. CONCLUSION

We have attempted in this Article to demonstrate the utility of
corpus linguistics in the interpretation of laws and to establish
criteria for the efficacy of this practice. We recognize that this Article
shifts between having a supportive tone and having a cautionary tone
to this endeavor. At all times, it should be kept in mind that
linguistic corpora provide a tool for those engaged in statutory
interpretation, but they say nothing about when this tool is most
useful. That judgment must come from a combination of legal
decisions about whether the distribution of word usage should
determine the outcome of a case, a further legal decision about what
"ordinary meaning" should mean in a legal context, and appropriate
238. Id. ¶ 88, 356 P.3d at 1282.
239. Justice Lee's analysis provoked a response from the majority, criticizing him for
engaging in expert analysis outside the bounds of the adversarial system. The issue was not the
legitimacy of his argument, but the legitimacy of judges taking the initiative to engage in
scientific investigation without the parties being afforded the opportunity to cross-examine or
otherwise challenge the analysis. Id. 11 16-21, 356 P.3d at 1264-66 (majority opinion).
Because COCA is publicly available and the results of searches transparent, we are not as
bothered by Justice Lee's foray as was the majority.
240. Search conducted on August 4, 2017. For example: "The teenager collapses. Van
Dyke continues shooting, emptying his weapon. In all, McDonald was shot 16 times." "And
then while she was lying dead on the floor, he emptied the gun into her."
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use of a corpus when one is used. This last point includes asking the
right questions, conducting the right searches, and drawing valid
inferences from both the presence and absence of data reflecting one
or another specific usage.
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